175 to the Crimea and left his thirteen year old son Ṣafā Girāi in Ḳazān. The only original document that survives from the period of the principality of Ḳazān dates from the brief reign of Ṣāḥib Girāi: it is a decree dated Ṣafar 13, 929 (= Jan. 1, 1523), confirming a family as *Tarkhān*'s, that is nobles freed from all taxes. The taxes are detailed so that the document is of some importance for the domestic history of the principality.

After vain efforts to come to an agreement with Russia, Ṣafā Girāi was driven from the throne by the Russian party in 1530; at the wish of the people it was not Shāh ʿAlī but Djān ʿAlī that was elected Khān; he was killed in 1535 in a rising of the national party, Ṣafā Girāi recalled and supported by his father Ṣāḥib Girāi, then Khān of the Crimea. The Russian attempts to restore their suzerainty had therefore for a long time no success; it was only in the year 1546 that Ṣafā Girāi was driven out and Shāh ʿAlī put in his place; but Ṣafā Girāi returned immediately after the departure of the Russians and held the throne till his death in 1549. He was succeeded by his two year old son Ötemish, who was taken to Russia in the following year, christened by the name of Alexander and lived till 1566. The brief and cruel reign of Shāh ʿAlī ended with his banishment. Yādiyār Muḥammad, a prince born in Astrakhan, was summoned from the land of the Noghai to Ḳazān as Khān. The Grand Duke Iwan who had already conducted two unsuccessful campaigns (1548 and 1550) against Ḳazān now appeared before the town with a larger army; after hard fighting Ḳazān was stormed on Oct. 2, 1552, and all armed men put to death.

361 The conquered town retained its former appearance and its military importance under Russian rule for a long time. The town had ten gates and a citadel separated from the other quarters of the town by a ditch; the old wooden wall was replaced by one of stone in 1555. The town was then about 600 cubits (= a mile) in length and 500 cubits (1500 yards) in breadth. To injure the commercial importance of the city, the Russian government as early as 1524 had founded the annual fair at Nijni-Novgorod; at the same time merchants were forbidden to go to the fair at Ḳazān. Christianity was industriously preached. Ḳazān was the see of an archbishop from 1555 and later of a metropolitan. The immigration from Russia proper assumed considerable importance.

Little is left of the old town; a tower in the citadel still bears the name of the princess Süyünbigi, wife of Ṣafā Girāi (she was previously married to Djān ʿAlī and later to Shāh ʿAlī). Under the influence of national Tatar movement the memory of this princess is kept green; in 1914 a biography of her appeared and a periodical for women is published under her name; but it is not definitely known when and how the tower received this name, and what parts date from the Tatar period and what from the Russian. During the xviii[th] century Ḳazān had lost all military importance and was easily taken — with the exception of the citadel — by Pugačev in July, 1774; there were then 2,867 houses in it. Even at this date Ḳazān was of much greater importance than Nijni-Novgorod as a centre of government and of culture. The university founded in 1804 became famous especially for its Oriental faculty (strictly the Oriental section of the faculty

[648]

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[206 cont.]
[648] him in the name of the Empress (1) to make Abulkhair refuse it,

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of October 21, 1745.

but the latter would not have paid any attention to his advice if other circumstances had not prevented him from acceding to the wishes of the Khivans. Nurali received a letter from the son of the Shah of Persia inviting him to come to him. This prince considered the khanate of Khiva his property, being the conqueror. Nurali was on the point of departing for Khiva when his wife, whom he had left in that city, sent word that the Persians were only inviting him there in order to put him to death (2). This news kept

2. Continuation of the history of Orenburg by Rychkov, events of 1745.

him back with his father.

[643] Meanwhile the leaders of the Middle Horde, who had had no relation with Russia for nearly two years, approached the Russian border and renewed their assurances of devotion to the Empress. Abul Mahmet left Turkestan to join his horde and sent a messenger to St. Petersburg to volunteer his services; later he renewed his oath of loyalty. Sultan Barak did likewise. He also sent an embassy to St. Petersburg.

[648] The Kazaks were not yet at peace when disturbances took place in the Volga Kalmuk horde. The rumor spread that a large section wished to leave Russia, on the invitation of Galdan Tsyren, to join their compatriots, the Dzungars. This rumor, which was confirmed in fact 26 years later, was false at this time, but it disturbed the government, especially when the news had been received from the Ural that a large number of Kalmuks had crossed over from the Russian bank to the Kazak side, and [207] when reports from Siberia stated that the Dzungarian [726] armies had reached the Irtysh /River/ in some places. Subsequent [727] events showed that the passage of the Kalmuks across the Ural

[212 cont.]

[448] [443] This measure was fully successful. Nurali was proclaimed khan in an assembly of the people, and they sent to the court Sultan Djanibek and several distinguished Kazaks, who came to bring this news to Orenburg. They said they had been sent on behalf of the Middle and the Little Hordes, and requested therefore that Khan Nurali be named khan of the two hordes. Several reasons made it impossible to satisfy this request. 1) The Russian officer who presided at the election of Nurali stated that Djanibek Batyr was the only elder of the Middle Horde who had taken part, and that he had always lived near Abulkhair, as had several tens of ordinary Kazaks who had long been separated from the Middle [441] Horde and who also lived among the subjects of Abulkhair. 2) Al- [443] most all the most distinguished sultans of the Middle Horde had either their sons or their closest kinsmen as hostages with the Dzungarian prince, who from that moment had begun to raise claims to sovereignty over the entire horde, and this caused the Russian government grave suspicions as to the obedience of that horde.

On the other hand they did not wish to vex Nurali by presenting a formal refusal to the request of his ambassador, and it [443] was decided to name him khan of the Kazaks without designating any horde. On the day of February 26, 1749, he was sent the imperial letter patent concerning his new office. At the same time another letter patent was sent in the name of the Kazak people to confirm their choice, and Nepluev was enjoined to invite Nurali to come to Orenburg and to proclaim him khan there in an imposing manner.

[662] Before speaking of this ceremony, we will say that [213] Nepluev and Tevkelev were aided in their design to cause Nurali's election by his mother, Khaness Papai, who by her intelligence had won the respect of the entire Little Horde and sometimes had much influence upon its administration. Because she liked the Russians, she had often dissuaded her husband Abulkhair from carrying out plans which were harmful to Russia (1). All this [562]

1. She possessed a stamp with her name,

[270 cont.]
X 648 721 had been provoked. This band was composed of 3,000 men under the command of Batyr Syrym, of whom we have already spoken. For a long time it threatened several forts on the Orenburg line, [724] and finally this daring band succeeded in winning a considerable victory at the fort of Tanalytsk and against a body of troops sent against them.

X 648 ● 668 In 1785 a revolution began in the internal administration of the Little Horde, which is of great note to the historian and very interesting to the political scientist. The end for which it was undertaken held to the plan conceived by Catherine and her ministry to establish peace among the Kazaks. We shall describe the means by which the local authorities attained such a desirable result. Baron Igelstrom, who was then appointed to the post of governor general of Orenburg and commander of the entire Russian border from the Caspian Sea to the Tobolsk gubernia, found the Little Horde in a state of violent agitation and the borders of the [721 provinces in his care in danger. Troops of armed Kazaks riding 727] about the left bank of the Ural River caused the constant fear of an attack and kept the peasants from busying themselves with the work in the fields. And whenever they found a chance, they carried men off, pillaged, and led away the livestock. The detachment commanded by Batyr Syrym showed itself even more daring.

X 648 721 662 His attack on the fort of Tanalytsk was one of the first events which took place after the arrival of Baron Igelstrom in Orenburg. In order to take advantage of this fact, Khan Nurali hastened to inform the new governor that all the brigandage was committed by Kazaks who were defying his orders; that Syrym was not satisfied with denying his authority, but was even arousing the entire horde against him, and that in order [271] to prevent the greatest disasters, both for Russia and for the Kazaks, it was indispensable to punish the rebels by force and to remove the fomenters of disorder from the horde. The Khan concluded as before by acknowledging his weakness and requesting help to bring the bandits to their proper duties.

[272 cont.]

X 648 No one stopped to reflect on the possibility or impossibility of carrying out this measure, because the Orenburg administration had proposed it itself and must have the means of accomplishing it.

[177] Having received the approbation of the court, Baron Igelstrom at once began to introduce the new order of things.

His first step produced results which were in perfect harmony X 648 with the end to which he aspired.

646 728 668 177 Without the intermediary of the Khan, he sent solemn proclamations throughout the entire horde, in which, without speaking of the Khan nor of the sultans, he invited the elders and the people to form an assembly in order to come to an agreement on the means of maintaining order in the horde and living in obedience to the Russian government. He advised them to renounce brigandage and raids and to expect the pardon they deserved for their repentance or severe punishments for the crimes which had been disturbing public order. These proclamations almost completely destroyed the last vestiges of the weak power of the Khan. Many Kazaks who were followers of the Khan abandoned him and joined his enemies, and all together they formed a national assembly which did not contain one sultan, and where Batyr Syrym, of whom we have spoken, twice presided as chief.

X 648 646 728 The confidence shown by the people in Syrym in this instance is very common, and is in perfect harmony with the Kazak notions of the greatness of spirit. But who would fail to be surprised at the consideration given in Orenburg to this [273] man who the year before had been the leader of a band of brigands, at whose head he had attacked Russian troops and forts?

All Syrym's actions showed that he was a man of vast intelligence but one unsatisfied, restless, and vindictive, and moreover, of an enterprising character rarely found among a half-savage people. After having distinguished himself among the bandits, he soon came to eminence in the council which had assembled to re-establish the general peace, as he believed that new and brilliant advantages lay in this for him. As he was an irreconcilable enemy of the Khan, not so much because of specific disputes with Nurali as of the longing he felt for the heriditary

[276 cont.]
he was no less quick to profit from it, as he was soon presented with an opportunity to do.

Syrym's followers, as much to please him as to satisfy their own greediness, did not stop with committing offenses against Nurali in all sorts of ways, but ended by attacking villages and pillaging everything they found there. Nurali, defenseless, turned to the power of Russia and requested an armed guard from the border authorities. When he was refused, he decided to withdraw to Orenburg for a time in order to save his life, and from this city he was taken to Ufa, where he died four years later. His brother Aichuvak was detained during this time in Uralsk.

It is useless to describe the impression which these events gave to Nurali's children and the other descendants of Abulkhair. The eldest and the best known, because of his intelligence and valor, was Sultan Erali, who had had frequent relations with Russia, as we have seen. But six years before he had conquered the Karakalpaks and lived with them on the Syr [Darya] (2). He

2. Bekehurin, an interpreter of Orenburg, traveled on the Syr in 1781, and found Sultan Erali was already sovereign of the Karakalpaks.

knew perfectly well who was mainly responsible for the misfortunes of his brothers and who had caused them to lose the protection of Russia, which Abulkhair and his line had had for more than half a century. Anxious to avenge the grievances of his family, he resolved to attack Syrym and marched against him with an army which was few in number but could be counted upon. Luck smiled upon Sultan Erali on this expedition. He captured the representative of the national assembly, the title which Syrym gave himself.

At this same time other tribes of the Little Horde, who were not attached to Abulkhair's family but also did not wish to follow the incitements of Syrym or of his principal accomplices and who were accustomed, furthermore, to having khans,

[277] elevated Kaip, a man of whom we have already spoken, to this position several times. A third part of the horde did not wish to recognize Kaip; but it asserted, as his subjects, that the Kazaks should have a khan, that their ancestors had found it necessary, and that they did not wish to set aside a custom which was hallowed by time. For this reason, they demanded either the return of Nurali or another khan in his place. During all this time, Syrym was Erali's prisoner.

The situation weakened the conviction of the Orenburg head, and Baron Igelstrom, being afraid of allowing the Kazaks to indulge themselves in new disputes, requested the confirmation of Kaip as khan of the entire Little Horde. The Empress was of an entirely different opinion. Having once decided to introduce a form of government in the steppes beyond the Ural River which was in harmony with that of the interior provinces, she did not wish to change her plan unless absolutely necessary, and she replied, with her usual firmness, with an explicit refusal to Baron Igelstrom on November 12, 1786.

Without entering into the good or the evil which could be produced by the authority of a khan among the Kazaks, we will only say that after all the proclamations made to the Little Horde in 1785 and 1786, Nurali's exile in Russia, and many other measures taken in order to introduce a new form of government among the Kazaks, Catherine could not give up a plan which had scarcely been tried without injury to her dignity. Consequently her reply was much more in accord with the dignity of the empire than was the proposal of the governor of Orenburg.

Besides, even if the Empress had consented to the restoration of the position of khan, she would not have preferred Kaip to the other sultans who had far more rights than he. Several circumstances were opposed to the accomplishment of his ambitious ideas. [579] First, a report was even made to Orenburg of the fact that while he was living on the Syr [Darya] after his expulsion from Khiva, [277] [278] he had often pillaged caravans and had expressed an open hatred for Russia (1). Second, there was another obstacle in the

1. See Baron Igelstrom's reports of September 23 and October 15, 1786.

[283 cont.]

X 648 It was in 1790 that he began to give the strongest proofs of his hatred. But before describing them, we believe it our duty to recall certain regulations made by Empress Catherine for the good of the hordes during the period when the establishment of peace seemed possible there and even close at hand.

[431 423] On August 13, 1786, on the occasion of a demand for a concession of land made by Khudai Mendy, sultan of the Middle Horde, the border authorities were commanded not only to yield it to him as well as to his subjects, but also to give assistance in money as a pure gift to every family which wished to settle.

On July 15, 1788 it was permitted to give land to Kazaks who went into Russia without requiring any confirmation for this.

[871] On February 28, 1789 the staff of the Kazak schools on the Orenburg line were confirmed and the salaries of the teachers and the expense of feeding the students at the cost of the government were settled. It was further commanded that their fathers be given, as encouragement, certificates of praise, gifts, etc.

[642] On April 30, 1789 Baron Igelstrom received an order to compose a plan for a constitution for the Kazaks based on folk customs, habits, and oral laws.

X 648 668 Although Russia had already recognized the absolute necessity of re-establishing the position of khan in the Middle Horde, the khan had not yet been elected when Syrym broke every [284] kind of liaison with the governor of Orenburg and declared himself the foremost enemy of the Russians. Not satisfied with having aroused his compatriots and having attacked the inhabitants on the right bank of the Ural River, he sought help in Bukhara and sent agents into that land to this end in 1790. The Khan's atalyk replied that help would be sent, but after a certain time. Meanwhile he advised Syrym to continue his raids on the Russian border. One of the envoys who had received this reply in Bukhara was later taken prisoner by the Ural Cossacks and personally gave the most positive details about his embassy.

X 648 646 721 In the month of March, 1791 Syrym, hoping to induce the entire Little Horde to invade Russia, convoked a great national assembly at the mouth of the Emba and had letters distributed everywhere to arouse the nation. This undertaking was not fully

[285 cont.]

pleaded since 1784 to be admitted under the suzerainty of Russia, once more repeated his request. His letter was sent to St. Petersburg, and on October 31 of the same year an ukase was given to receive him as a vassal of the empire.

Meanwhile Syrym was manifesting more and more his desire to avenge the destruction of his power and the loss of the influence he had wielded in the horde during the time when the position of khan was considered unnecessary. At this time he had not completely lost the regard of his compatriots, which he owed to his earlier importance and his personal bravery. He still had enough means of doing harm to Russia and to the sultans who were devoted to Russia, above all when he had united what was left of his group with the subjects of Kaip, who had died shortly before and who had bequeathed to his children all the hatred of the descendants of Abulkhair which he had inherited from his father and his grandfather. After Kaip's death, the Kazaks who had recognized his authority passed under that of his sons, Sultans Abulgazy and Burkan (1). Syrym allied himself [286] with them

1. Their third brother, Shirgazy, was then in the service of Russia. He lived [286] in Petersburg for a long time, became accustomed to the glitter of Catherine's court, and seemed to have become European. But when he returned to the horde at the beginning of this [19th] century, he showed himself to be the worthy descendant of his bloodthirsty ancestors. Nothing of remark is known about his other brothers.

and knew how, with the superiority of his intelligence, to make them the instruments of his plans.

Being unable to do without their help, Syrym ceased to inspire the people with contempt for the position of khan in general, as he had done before. But he proclaimed everywhere

[286 cont.]
that Erali's election was illegal, claiming that Baron Igelstrom had concluded an agreement with the Little Horde by which he had promised, in the name of the government, to remove the descendants of Abulkhair forever from the position of khan. Using every possible weapon against Russia, he did not forget to call the Koran to his aid, pointing out that it is forbidden to Moslems to submit themselves to Christian powers. To this same end he sought, in 1791, to induce the Kazaks to end their barter with the Russians and, if possible, to withdraw into the interior of the steppes. He spread the rumor that he was expecting the Bukharan army which the khan of that country had promised him. He sent his son to Khiva in 1793 to ask for similar aid, and although he received a flat refusal, he boasted nevertheless of the success of the embassy. In 1792 he addressed an extremely insolent letter to Peutling, chief of the viceroyalty of Ufa, in which it was not enough to insult him by the most coarse expressions, but the Empress was attacked as well. Finally, in his rage, he solemnly declared war against Russia. The results of this declaration were several new raids by bandits, made by Syrym upon Ilezkoi [Iletski] Gorodok [now Ilek], Fort Kalmuk, and various other places on the Iletsk line.

Khan Erali could not make his enemy see reason, and therefore in 1792 he demanded that troops be sent to the horde to punish the offenders. The Empress did not grant this request. Rightly contemptuous of Syrym's malicious intentions, she [287] did not wish to spill the blood of the Kazaks, especially since the severe defeat they had suffered in 1790 in the midst of their steppes at the hands of the Ural Cossacks had in no way corresponded to her humanitarian intentions nor to the expectations of the ministry.

In the midst of the disturbances which were then troubling the Little Horde, we should note Erali's request for a house to be built for him near the fort of Orsk and the request of Sultan Ishim for the construction of a city in the midst of the steppes. Circumstances did not permit the satisfaction of this last demand at that time, but Erali's request would have been granted if he had not died in the month of June, 1794, after ruling the Little Horde for three years.

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BRIEF

The Kazakhs, one of the major Turkic peoples in the USSR, live in a strategic area in the heart of Soviet Central Asia. There are evidences of deep and continuing conflict between their way of life and the policies imposed upon them by the Soviet Communists. This study was intended to describe those sources of conflict and to indicate their implications for psychological warfare. A secondary objective of the study was to determine how well the vulnerabilities of a people inaccessible to direct methods of research can be assessed.

The traditional Kazakh way of life is pastoral nomadism; they abhor the settled farming life. Their customs and values reflect this independent heritage, and the Soviet drive during the 1930's to collectivize the nomads met with resistance. Between 1926 and 1939, the Kazakhs suffered a net population loss of almost one million--nearly one-fourth of their number in 1926. This loss was the result of starvation and disease, mass arrests and liquidations, flight across the border, and migration to neighboring Turkic peoples and to the urban and industrial areas of Siberia, all factors indirectly attributable to the imposition of Soviet control.

The organization of Kazakh society according to kin groups has been an important factor in contact with the Soviets. It has eased Kazakh transition to collective life, since most collective farms comprise single groups of blood relatives, but at the same time the closeness of the family ties has frequently led to the charge of nepotism by the Soviets.

The antiviotic revival of Kazakh interest in their traditional heroes and customs was encouraged by the Soviets as a wartime morale measure. This revival--at once political, religious, and cultural in nature--became so strong that the Soviets considered it a threat and have attempted to suppress it. The importance of blood ties to the Kazakhs heightened their resentment of Soviet condemnation of their national heroes, whom they regard also as their ancestors. The Kazakhs' veneration of their past history and culture is fostered by their native religion, a blend of ancestor worship and shamanism. This folk religion is not formally organized. Administratively, the Soviets treat the Kazakhs as Moslems, although it is difficult to say how much Islam has influenced the rural Kazakhs.

The Kazakhs appear to be making only a minimal contribution to important republic activities which the Soviets are trying to encourage--industry and transport, Party and government. One explanation may be that the Kazakhs are not given equal opportunities; there is some evidence that the Slavs regard them as inferiors. Another reason is that the Kazakhs are not coming forward for training and advancement. Apparently they prefer to keep apart from the Slavic population of the republic; this conclusion is supported by the low rate of intermarriage between the two peoples. The Kazakhs appear to be opposed to many aspects of Sovietization, but at present their resistance is largely passive.

The local press proved to be a most useful source of information in the present study. The reports of local reactions and activities in relation to the official Party line provided many indications of strengths and weaknesses, trouble spots and failures. In addition to this source, research methods from many disciplines were combined to utilize all available data and information.

The fact that positions of responsibility are filled by Slavs means that they are almost the only ones in Kazakhstan to be seen enjoying the material rewards so conspicuously granted to members of the Soviet elites. Regardless of whose fault this may be, it must at times breed resentment among the Kazakhs. Similarly, the preponderance of Slavs in higher governmental, Party, executive, and judicial positions means that the Kazakhs are almost never governed, judged, or defended by their fellows. It must often happen that Kazakhs who feel they are the victims of injustice identify this as discrimination.

NATIONALITY POLICY

Soviet policy toward the minority nationalities within the USSR has also created a long-standing dilemma in the case of the Kazakhs—a dilemma which appears to provide an important vulnerability for psychological warfare exploitation. This policy strives to create national political units which are "socialist in content, national in form." This means in effect that the political structure and economy of the various national groups are organized along standard Soviet lines and their energies are directed toward Soviet objectives, but the symbols of nationality (particularly the local languages) are retained to grant a sense of continuity with past traditions. The devising and implementing of this policy was the earliest responsibility assumed by Stalin under Lenin's guidance. It has had varying degrees of success in different areas, but in the balance has proved to be a very useful tool of Soviet administration.

The Kazakhs, however, are a people still too deeply attached to their old life and its traditions and values to accept mere lip service to their national heritage. Every time an effort has been made to raise Kazakh morale and productivity by permitting public attention to national heroes and literature, the result has been an enthusiasm the Soviets have viewed as threatening. This was particularly true when, during World War II, national patriotism was extensively exploited throughout the USSR to inspire the people to defend their homeland. Among the Kazakhs this developed into a cult glorifying their native heroes and culture, a phenomenon which had also appeared during the 1920's and had grown until it became such a threat that it was ruthlessly suppressed by the Soviets. After the war Kazakh nationalism, left unsuppressed, continued to grow in strength until finally in the 1950's a purge was required to check its growing force.

It seems certain that these sentiments will lie for a long time close beneath the surface, available for mobilization through psychological warfare, regardless of the turns Soviet nationality policy might take in the event of another war. For this reason, considerable attention has been devoted in this report to Kazakh history, including its national heroes, and to Kazakh cultural values and traditions.

One method which the Soviets employ to make the minority republics "national in form" is the utilization wherever possible of native Communists to fill positions in the local Party and government. As might be expected, in the Kazakh SSR there is a chronic shortage of

east, he gained support among many elements of the Great Horde, the easternmost of the Kazakh divisions. He sought the support of China, which was promised him, and the allegiance of the Kirgiz, which they refused. His strategy was to use the Kirgiz mountain pastures as his base of operations against the Russians. He campaigned against the Kirgiz and was at first successful, but in the spring of 1847 he fell into a trap, was defeated by the Kirgiz, taken prisoner, and executed.

During much of Russian rule Kazakhstan was a place of exile. Banished there were such outstanding individuals as Taras Shevchenko, the national poet of the Ukraine, and Dostoevsky, great Russian novelist.

In the economic sphere, outside capital was brought in during this period by traders and bankers of Tatar and Russian origin. In an isolated case, a British mining development was undertaken at Ridders in northeast Kazakhstan. Religious dissidents came to settle and farm the north and northeast portions of the region. In general, however, the commercial and cultural ties between Kazakhstan and Russia were not deep.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1900

The Kazakhs were sensitive to political developments in Russia, however. During the revolution of 1905 the Kazakhs had a distant echo of the events in European Russia. During World War I they engaged in a rebellion of their own, a year before the Russian Revolution of 1917. In this revolt the Kazakhs objected to military conscription and to confiscation of their property, which was presumably taken over for war purposes but in fact often ended up in private, non-military hands. There is some indication that Russian private interests "provoked" the revolt in order to confiscate Kazakh land and herds.

At the time of the 1917 Revolution, the Kazakhs already had a year's experience of revolt behind them. In opposition to and under the influence of Russian contact, the Kazakhs underwent their own political evolution; that is, they evolved a political expression of their nationalist consciousness. It took the form of the Alash-Orda party. This was not really a party, for it lacked a formal organization and a platform or explicit political philosophy; it was vague in its aims and in its external relationships to other parties and nations. Its leaders were Kazakh intellectuals who later disbanded, some joining the Bolsheviks, some fleeing to Turkey.

During the civil war, from 1918 to 1922, the White generals Kolchak and Dutov were faced by the Red Army commander, Frunze, who appealed to the workers in Turkestan to support him. In April 1919 the Central Committee of the Party issued a decree calling for a founding Congress of Kirgiz Soviets in Orenburg (now Chkalov, in the southern Urals). In July of that year, a Revolutionary Committee for the Administration of the Kirgiz Districts was established. (At that time, the area including the present Kazakh and Kirgiz republics was administered as one unit, which bore the name Kirgiz.)

By the end of 1919, Kolchak was defeated. With the destruction of Kolchak's southern army in the fall of 1919, direct contact between

Most of these early estimates were phrased in terms of number of Kazakh households. Assuming an average of five persons per household, one can derive such figures as the following for the number of Kazakhs in the Russian empire in the 19th century: 1,950,000 in 1824, 2,000,000 in 1832, and 2,200,000 in 1871. The 1897 Census, which included all but a few thousand Kazakhs resident in China, gave the Kazakh population as 3,800,000. This was the only 19th century estimate with any claim to accuracy.

These estimates indicate a general consistency to the population trends of the 19th century. The increase occurred despite a series of wars of liberation, rebellions, and other evidences of unrest; this was the era of the Kazakh wars and uprisings against the Russians.

The rapid increase which started in the last three decades of the 19th century continued into the beginning of the 20th. In 1911 the number of Kazakhs living within the Russian empire was estimated at 4,400,000, an increase of 13.6 per cent in 14 years.

From the beginning of the 19th century, then, when the earliest extensive Russian investigation of Central Asia took place, to the eve of World War I the Kazakh population approximately doubled. The rate of increase appears to have been low at the beginning of the period, rising toward the end.

KAZAKHS IN THE 1926 CENSUS

According to the 1926 Census of the Soviet Union,[1] there were 3,970,000 Kazakhs in the USSR. Of these, some 3,700,000 lived in Kazakhstan (comprising 57% of the population of the republic) and 270,000 outside the republic.

The absolute drop from 1911 to 1926 was thus 430,000, or nearly 10 per cent of the Kazakh population. This loss reflects the political conditions of the time. The relatively peaceful period prior to World War I, which had permitted the increase from 1897 to 1911, was followed by a Kazakh uprising in 1916, then by the Russian Revolution and civil war. In the years after the civil war, 1922-1926, improved conditions allowed the Kazakhs to recover to a point slightly exceeding their 1897 number but still considerably below the population estimate of 1911.

In 1926 the great majority of the Kazakhs still maintained their traditional economy of herding. Seventy per cent of all economically active Kazakhs were reported as herders, 27 per cent as agriculturalists (largely mixed farming, i.e., with some herding mixed in), and less than 3 per cent in all other economic activities (such as industrial and white-collar work).

Of the 783,000 Kazakh households in Kazakhstan, 205,000 or 26 per cent were permanently settled. While this figure was based only on Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, it agrees with the total farming percentage. Agriculture is a sedentary way of life; approximately the same proportion of total Kazakhs were reported as occupied in agriculture as were reported as sedentary in Kazakhstan.

[1] *TSUNKHU, Peredpi' SSSR* (Census of the USSR), 1926 *et seq.*

These apparent contradictions arise because Kazakh society is an amalgam of kin and political relationships. 182

Soviet writers in Central Asia find it difficult to explain the inconsistencies in Kazakh society; this difficulty is due in part to the series of readymade categories of evolution which Communism teaches. They are dealing not with abstractions but with living people, whose lives are complex. The Kazakhs have lived on the margins of great empires—Persian, Chinese, Russian—for many centuries. They themselves have participated in great empires, their own and others'. Not only the glory, but some of the institutions, have rubbed off on them; they have developed certain institutions which are normally part of states and empires. At times they have formed states and empires, and at times they have contracted to form smaller units. 177

During the 1920's, a group of Kazakh intellectuals, together with certain romantically disposed Russians, constructed a picture of Kazakh society in which each social unit formed a closely-knit cooperative core. All members of a village helped each other, since all were united by ties of blood and neighborhood. The Kazakh intellectuals included former leaders, such as Baitursunov and Bukeikhanov, of the Alash-Orda, the Kazakh political party of the period 1917-1922. Ryskulov and Sadvokasov, also Kazakhs, propounded the same idea; the Russian scholars Polochanskii, Kushner, and, as late as 1933, Fedorov continued along the same line.[1] 829 [668]

With the onset of collectivization, the Soviet government could no longer let these theories continue unopposed. In 1926 Moscow began to denounce the notion of the persistence of primeval communist conditions among the Kazakhs into the era of the Russian Revolution. The Soviet boss of Kazakhstan, Goloshchekin, attacked the concept of the Kazakh nomadic village as a communal, cooperative, undifferentiated whole. Between 1928 and 1930 the government of Kazakhstan handed over each year to the GPU hundreds of Kazakh families classified as enemies of the workers. The campaign to exterminate the rich Kazakhs as exploiters of the poor intensified between 1930 and 1933. The aim of this campaign was to bring the Kazakh herdsman into collective farm life, to settle him down as a tiller of the soil, as well as to find the equivalents among the Kazakhs of the rich peasants of Russia. The aul was equated by Goloshchekin with a peasant village anywhere; the wealthy Kazakh villager was equated with the Kulak, and thus regarded as subject to liquidation.[2] 177 648 [474]

This policy became the official line, and the forces advocating the theory of communal economy and polity were silenced. One theory advanced in support of the new line stated that the Tsarist colonialists supported the village leaders as a counterpoise to the khans and the sultans, and used the local leader as a lever to crush the rule of the khans. According to this theory, the khans were of foreign birth and the village leaders, pictured as allies of the Tsars, were of Kazakh birth.[3]

[1] Tagzhanov, 1934, pp. 6-8, 32.
[2] Goloshchekin, 1931, pp. 177-198, 208.
[3] Tagzhanov, 1934, pp. 38-39.

177 According to the official line, Kazakh society belonged to the feudal
648 stage of development at the time of the Russian conquest. This formulation has survived to the present day. It is supported by a stage theory of history, derived from Karl Marx. According to this theory, all societies prior to the Russian Revolution were either tribal or divided into classes; class societies were either capitalist or feudal. According to this theory the Kazakhs are not tribal because they are divided into classes, but they are not capitalist; therefore they are feudal. Never, however, did the proponents of this theory make a detailed comparison between Kazakh society and the nations of medieval Europe.

The Kazakhs, by this doctrine, were permitted to retain their
[668] national heroes, the khans of old, among them the leaders of revolts against the Russian conquest, Batyr Srym, Taimanov, Kenesary, Nurmuhammed. In the Soviet Union of the 1930's, the Tsars were still considered hated oppressors of all men, Russians and non-Russians, in the Russian empire. The Tsars were an absolute and unrelieved evil, and a war for colonial liberation was progressive and good. Yet during the 1930's, writers tended to stay away from the description of these revolts against the Tsars by Kazakhs and other peoples. Most of the writings were concerned with such topics as Kazakh participation in the 1905 revolution, or the revolt of the Kazakhs in 1916. During World
[538] War II, however, a number of books and articles were written describing the 19th century revolts as great events, true expressions of anti-Tsarist sentiment, part of the general hatred of Tsarism in which the Bolsheviks shared. Vinikin, Bekmakhanov, Sholnbaev and others—for the most part Kazakhs—wrote in admiration of the Kenesarys and Taimanovs.

Then with the 1950's began a violent purge of these writings. In the current phase, Tsarism is still regarded as an exploiting and oppressive institution, but a new twist has been added to the story. The Tsars by their conquests are now said to have saved the Turks of Central Asia from an even worse fate, conquest by English and the Germans, by Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. Pan-Turkism would bring all Turks together under one government—not that of Moscow—and is subjected to the most bitter denunciations by the Soviet press as bourgeois-nationalist, cosmopolitan, and so forth. Pan-Islamism would bring all Moslems together, Turks, Persians, and Arabs; although it is somewhat less realistic in its appeal to the Kazakhs, it is also sharply denounced in the Soviet press.

Whether England or Germany or the Pan-Turks would have swallowed up Central Asia is a matter of historical speculation which need not detain us here. On the other hand, the denunciation by the modern Soviet writers of the older Kazakh leaders such as Kenesary and Taimanov is of great interest. The Soviet specialists in Central Asia seek to differentiate Kazakh revolts into two types, those which were progressive and those which were not. The revolts of Nurmuhammed, Taimanov, and Kenesary Kasymov are all depicted as reactionary and antihistorical, because they sought to tear the Kazakhs away from the Russian empire and to retain the age-old oppression by the khans. Other figures such
[668] as Batyr Srym are treated as progressive historically because they led a revolt not against the Tsars but against the nobility of their own society.

systematic, and subject to a number of qualifications. What data there are, however, suggest that among the people of Kazakhstan Russians marry Russians and Turks marry Turks. Again it appears that the Kazakhs do not wish to mingle with the Russians, just as, in the political domain, they do not join the Party nor engage in other political activities with the Russians. In general, on the basis of what direct evidence there is, this attitude may be summed up as noncompliance, or a kind of passive resistance. Corroborative data are seen in the economic domain, where the Kazakhs are not fulfilling plans.

THE SOVIET THEORY OF CULTURAL CHANGE

The theory of acculturation in anthropology has been devised to describe the social process which occurs when two different cultures come into close contact with each other. This theory has arisen out of the reflections of western European and American ethnologists on contact between their own culture and others. But there is in western civilization no general theory of culture which deals with total control of the social relations and direction of change resulting from such contact. The Russian policy toward minorities within the Soviet Union is nothing other than a theory of controlled acculturation. In their theory of history and in the formulation of their minority policy the Soviet theoreticians have proclaimed a method whereby they—and they alone—are able to control the processes of social development. They boast control over the direction in which the different peoples of the Soviet Union will change; they claim the power to dictate the manner of the change and the form that the ultimate society will take.

Starting out as a society of pastoral nomads in which membership was based on paternal kinship traced from a common male ancestor (a society also divided into aristocrats and commoners), the Kazakhs joined—or rather, were drafted into—the Soviet world. The Soviet ethnographers depict the Kazakh society as an amalgam of institutions surviving from the past, coupled with Soviet features such as collective farm organization, Party membership, and government by soviets. The survivals include the family as the unit of production and consumption, and the traditional village organization, upon which the collective farm has been superimposed. Another survival is nepotism, which is ever present in Kazakh political life. A society steeped in traditions of kinship thinks of kinship as the means for social cooperation; hence, nepotism is inherent in the very nature of Kazakh society and inevitably finds its way into the political life. But it is incompatible with the Soviet pattern and it is attacked as such.

Soviet criticism of these features, and the constant drive to eradicate them, are essential elements in the theory of controlled social and cultural change. This change originating in the contact between the Russian and the Kazakh cultures becomes a part of the general pattern of controlled acculturation. This, however, is only the theory.

In reality there is little evidence that the grand plan for social change is being carried out, or even that there is a means for carrying

of Grand Mufti Abderrahman Rasulayev in June 1942; it called upon the world of Islam to cooperate in the defeat of Nazism.[1] The most recent of the congresses was convoked in May 1952 to denounce American agression in Korea.[2]

The policy of expediency and opportunism which has motivated the Soviet manipulation of the Islamic peoples within its borders need not be discussed here. Activities of the Islamic hierarchy have been permitted and supported only when they have served the interests of the Soviet regime. Of greater significance is the error of hyperorganization into which the Soviet regime has fallen. It has in effect perpetuated the error of the Tsarist regime, exposed by Grigoriev, with regard to the Kazakhs and the Kirgiz. Congresses are convoked by rubber stamp to denounce that which Moscow denounces. And the membership and representation of these congresses are augmented by rubber stamp to lend the force of greater numbers to their resolutions. Thus age-old errors are carried forward into the second half of the 20th century.

In summary, then, the religion of the Kazakhs is an amalgam of aboriginal shamanism with certain borrowings from Islam among the folk cults. Since Islam in Central Asia is the religion of the sedentary farmers and the urban societies, the Kazakhs have not had very much direct contact with it, except perhaps for those among the ruling strata of Kazakh khans and sultans. Both the Tsarist and the Soviet regimes have mistakenly grouped the Kazakh nomads in the general category of Central Asiatic Moslems. Although this administrative policy may eventually result in the full incorporation of the Kazakhs into the Islamic world of Central Asia, such is far from the case today. The Pan-Islam movement, working toward the unification of all Islamic peoples, has had small visible effect on the Kazakhs. Interviews conducted in Paris, Munich, and Istanbul among Kazakh DP's point clearly to the lack of contact between the Kazakh herdsmen and Islamic influences in the 1940's. The Soviet regime sometimes adds the denunciation of "Pan-Islamicist" in the round of attack on a political heretic, but it does so by mechanical rote, drawing upon the general armament of the propagandist and the agitator. Rarely is a specific charge made against a Kazakh deviationist; never does the Kazakh press consider it necessary to root out the ideology of Pan-Islam among Kazakhs, although such is frequently the Soviet attitude toward other peoples of Soviet Central Asia.

NATIVISM

Nativism, as a religious development among people who have felt the impact of western civilization, has begun to receive considerable attention in recent anthropological literature.[3] In many parts of the world, natives have reacted to contact with the western culture by rejecting it

[1] Syria (83), 23 Jun 42; *L'Orient Moderne* (87), 1942, p. 272.
[2] Bonniguen (11), 1952.
[3] One of the sharpest formulators and most extensive contributors to the theory was the late Ralph Linton.

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668 and seeking a revival of their own native culture. They frequently do this by attributing a mystical power to their aboriginal culture and selecting from it elements to serve as a source of strength in their present battle with the western world. These elements then become combined with features of western culture. The general term nativism has been used to describe this pattern of cultural development. The concept is applicable to many contemporary situations; the Celtic revival in Wales and Ireland may be regarded as a revivalistic form of nativism, and certain elements in the foundation of the state of Israel belong under the same heading.

Although the symbols and professed aims of nativistic movements are cultural and political in nature, their primary motivating force is essentially religious. Despite their frequent lack of purposeful organization, nativistic movements can have great strength; they are born of desperation and fed by a fervor much like that which characterizes messianic religions. Frequently, in fact, the leaders become in effect messiahs; in other cases the revered figures of the movement are heroes of the past.

668 Nativism among the Kazakhs has followed the latter course, focusing on the mythical ancestors and later heroes of Kazakh history. During the period 1916-1922, a nativistic political movement arose in what is today Kazakhstan (at that time Kirgizia). This movement—the Alash-Orda—was not a political party in the strict sense of the term, although it undertook a broad range of political activities, within the European frame of meaning; it supplied a leadership and ideology to a movement seeking the cultural as well as the political unification of the Kazakh nomads. The general chaos on the steppes of Asia after the collapse of Tsarism and before the solidification of the Soviet rule provided the opportunity for such a movement. In those years, the nascent era of the Soviet regime, Moscow was involved in revolution and civil war, and had little time or manpower to spare for the integration of Central Asia into Bolshevik-Leninism. In fact, Moscow reacted in a vaguely friendly way to the Alash-Orda since it too was antagonistic to Tsarism. For a brief moment, it appeared to the members of the Kazakh political movement that Moscow would supply the means for the liberation of the Kazakhs.

The Alash-Orda had no specific political program other than urging itself as the representative of the Kazakh people. It made no real effort toward political separatism from the Russian regime; possibly it felt that this would come naturally, or that the time was not yet ripe and the leaders themselves not far enough advanced politically to call for such a move. The general slogan, the name Alash-Orda, under which these Kazakh leaders and intellectuals sought to unify their people, reflects their desire for unity as a people.

The Orda is the horde, the broad organizational unit of Kazakh society, which in recent centuries had known no unity, but only a division into three and later four separate hordes. The name represents the revival of a social and political organization from the distant past of the Kazakhs. Even the smaller hordes had but little meaning for the Kazakhs after the middle of the 19th century. And the unification of all

Kazakhs in one horde under one political government had not been realized since the 15th century, except for a brief adventure in unification by Khan Tiavka at the end of the 17th century. 668

The term Alash recalls even more ancient days, for it refers to the mythical founder of all Kazakhdom, the ancestor of all Kazakhs, Alash, or Alach. The figure of Alash is not a fiction; he lived in the era of the emperor Tamerlane, near the end of the 14th century. According to the tale recorded in the 19th century of the origin of the Kazakh people, the descendants of Alash divided into three hordes, which in turn formed the basis for the social organization which existed on the eve of the Russian conquest.[1] "Alash" became first a Kazakh battle cry, evoking the name of their glorious ancestry, and finally the name of their first political party. [113] [126]

During the 1920's those leaders of the Alash-Orda who were not purged were gradually absorbed into the Soviet Party and civil life; some of them, Tynyshpaev, Baitursunov, and Bukeikhanov, became active journalists and scholars under the Soviets. They continued to "glorify" the Kazakh past, and were roundly denounced for this by Soviet propagandists. The issue which aroused Soviet disapproval was their representation of the Kazakh community as a sort of idyllic, primitive communism, in which each man helped his neighbor, rich and poor sharing alike. This doctrine was inacceptable to the Soviets of the 1930's, for the line had now become that the Kazakh village was torn with class strife between exploiter and exploited. In the course of this controversy, the old Alash-Orda leaders were purged and liquidated, in a severe struggle which was still going on as late as 1934.[2] 648 668 [204]

There were companion movements to the Alash-Ordists of Kazakhstan among other people of Central Asia. At the time of the Russian Revolution the political development among the Turks of southern Turkestan and the Caucasus bore the name of Basmachi, while that among the Turks of the southern Urals was known as the Bashkurd (the Bashkir name for themselves); among the Tartars of the Volga region the movement was called the Idil-Ural (Idil or Itil or Idel is an old Turkic name for the Volga River), and a similar movement in Uzbekistan and neighboring areas was known as the Djadid. Some of these movements were markedly and avowedly oriented toward foreign sources.

The Basmachi, for example, geographically close to Turkey, had a strong pro-Turkish orientation, or rather, it endorsed Pan-Turanianism more strongly than the other movements, and this brought it closer to the Turks of Turkey. The Pan-Turanian movement advocates the political unification of all Turks under one state and government, which would stretch from China to European Turkey and the Balkans; it involves open propaganda for separation of Turkestan from Russia. This doctrine is therefore a sensitive subject in Moscow, and the cause of some tension. It was and is a far more dangerous threat than was the Alash-Orda; the strongest Soviet denunciation of the Alash-Ordists is that they were connected with Pan-Turanianism through the Basmachi. Actually, there

[1] Valikhanov, 1904, pp. 299-300.
[2] For a summary, see Togaibaev, 1934, passim.

C48 C68 is little evidence of contact between the Alash-Orda and the Basmachi, at least at the beginning of the 1920's. But of late the various movements have become combined in the minds of the survivors, and this integration is attributed by them to the past of 30 years ago. Among the most active in this connection is Zeki Walidi Togan, a Turkic historian, now in Turkey, and once a leader in these movements.

The Kazakh revivalists were actively sought out and suppressed by the Soviet regime in the late twenties and early thirties. However, when the USSR was attacked by Germany, Moscow sought to use all tactics at its disposal to encourage the peoples in the Soviet Union to resist Hitler. One such tactic was the encouragement of local cultural traditions among the various peoples, the creation of a native pride which they might fight to preserve. The Kazakhs were encouraged to develop their own history, with the sole proviso that the Soviet era be depicted as the culminating point in their development. This policy was related to the previously cited theory which viewed Tsarism as the lesser evil to Turkestan's being swallowed up by the English, the Germans, or the Chinese. The Soviet policy during World War II produced a great revival of Kazakh in-group feeling, centered around the glorification of Kazakh heroes of the past. Since the Kazakhs had developed their own historical studies [819] during the past century, a process which was accelerated in the Soviet period, the movement to popularize Kazakh heroes and their deeds was turned over to the historians.

Khan Kenesary Kasymov was much written about, discussed, and praised; his name became a popular byword among the Kazakhs in the 1940's, after a century of oblivion. One Kazakh historian, Gabidullah Bekmakhanov, wrote a full-length history of Kenesary's activities against the Russians; this work, prepared as a doctoral dissertation in 1943, was published in 1947 in Alma-Ata. An official history of Kazakhstan written by Abdykalykov, a Kazakh, and the nominal co-author Pankratova (who since has become president of the Historical Section of the All-Union Academy of Sciences) likewise assigned a great and positive historical role to Kenesary. Other pronouncements of the period were less temperate; Sharipov, a Kazakh historian writing in 1949, pictured Kenesary as the prime national liberator. Two professors of history, Ismailov and Djumaliev, took the same line, the latter in a history book written for Kazakh school children.

The movement sought other heroes in the Kazakh past, especially those who had been active against the Russians: Batyr Srym was presented as a heroic figure by his official biographer, Viatkin; the historical significance of Isatai Taimanov, a rebel or liberator of the middle of the 19th century, was advanced by one Shakhmatov; an obscure figure who led a revolt among the Kazakhs of the Syr-Darya against the Russians, Batyr Djankhodji Nurmuhammed, was described by T. Shoinbaev.

The historical tradition which developed was clearly Kazakh, the result of the Kazakhs' search for a native expression of their own, the recreation of a tradition which had lain dormant for several decades.

C68 Kazakh nativism as a broad movement with a politico-religious orientation has taken the form of a many-faceted cultural revival. The

choice of the figure Alash, the founding ancestor of Kazakhdom, reflects 668
the general structure of Kazakh society. In reviving its cultural heritage,
a society established on the principle of patrilineal descent and organ-
ized according to carefully traced genealogies naturally would seek to
re-emphasize those genealogies and to glorify the founding ancestors,
whether mythical, fictional, or actual. Mythical Alash was not, at least [M13]
not entirely, for he lived in the time of Tamerlane. It is not clear that
he is the ancestor of all Kazakhs, or even of all Kazakhs of the "white-
bone" or nobility. He is the founding ancestor of all Kazakhs by a con-
venient fiction, a fiction which includes the descent lines of the nobles,
for only a few of the nobility can demonstrate an actual descent from
Alash. Nevertheless, he counts as the ancestor of all, and as such he
enters the shadowy domain of half-myth, half-history, which suits the
temper of the present Kazakh traditionalism admirably.

Descent from a wolf and a doe is no longer an acceptable expression
for one's lineage; the world of the steppe has become disenchanted. But [1114]
a great historical figure out of the past—distant enough and glorious
enough—is a suitable expression of the Kazakh quest for social, polfti-
cal, and cultural unity. The emergence of Alash as a battle cry, the
invoking of a distant ancestor in the formation of a modern party, is a
Kazakh solution peculiarly their own. The concern of the Kazakh his-
torians of the 1940's with similar figures, in this instance the leaders
of resistance to the Russian conquest, emerges from the same cultural
theme, with certain additions. The figures of the 19th century Kazakh
rebels, Kenesary, Srym, Taimanov, and the others, are ancestors taken
from the past. They are the ancestors of many descent lines whose
living members are conscious of the relationship; they are symbols of
an anti-Russian movement.

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the uneven commodity flow creates an unbalanced economy. The Kazakh republic is far from becoming economically self-sufficient. Fourth, the key to understanding the industrial picture in the KSSR is the total economic dependence of the Kazakhs on Russia for all consumer commodities. These include clothing, processed foods, furniture, and all electrical and electronic commodities, such as light bulbs and radios; motor supplies, automobiles, and the gas and lubricants necessary to run them; stoves and all other heating devices for using the coal and lignite the Kazakhs themselves produce.

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A good example is afforded by the chemical industry. Kazakhstan has long been known for its riches in salts and other chemicals. In the 19th century, shortly after the annexation of the territory by Russia, a small-scale chemical plant was established at Chimkent. To this day, this remains the sole chemical-pharmaceutical plant in the entire republic, although it has been expanded under the Soviets.[1] The bulk of the chemicals are extracted as raw materials, shipped elsewhere for processing, and only then made available to Kazakhstan, within the framework of the general pattern for distribution of these materials.

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Finally, it is clear that this economic dependence on Russia serves to reinforce Moscow's political control over the peoples of Kazakhstan.[2]

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The problem of manpower and the training of labor is central here. The industry of Kazakhstan, aside from the prerevolutionary mining centers, was established by means of forced labor camps at Karaganda, which during the 1930's was an NKVD area, and by the transfer of workers from Leningrad in the same period; during the war, workers from Moscow, Leningrad, and the Donbass were brought in for work in industry and mining. The Kazakhs have not participated in this industrial development. Very few industries requiring skilled labor have been established in Kazakhstan, and those few are based on a labor force derived from Russia and the Ukraine. The Kazakhs are not being introduced to the techniques which Russians are learning to master in the process of their industrial growth. The industrial picture confirms the conclusion drawn from the examination of the social and political scenes: The native Kazakhs are being encouraged by the Soviets to enter into industry, but they are not coming forward to be trained; they are holding back from participation in Soviet life.

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K [177] [668]

[1] Kazaev, 1949.
[2] Baisak (6), 1949.

one cannot escape the fact that the various societies and peoples of the Soviet Union are being reshaped and remolded with the image of Soviet culture as the target. The political life is that of Moscow's creation, as is the economic; the religious is that which is permitted by the central regime. The language of each nationality—as it is taught in the schools, or written in the newspapers—is the one which Moscow has decided upon. The various nationalities themselves have been regrouped, often arbitrarily, for the purpose of greater convenience of administration by Moscow. 177

The grandiose and sweeping nature of the changes planned under Soviet nationality policy is sufficient to assure that major change is in fact taking place. A question exists only in regard to the direction such change will take and how far it will deviate from the plan. Whatever the direction of change, the cost in dislocation and suffering among the minority peoples will remain enormous.

KAZAKH ART AND LETTERS

In the chapter dealing with Kazakh religion and religious developments, a discussion of current trends in history writing in Central Asia was included to illustrate the rise of nativism, the idealization of native culture. While the connection between historiography and religion is not immediately apparent, there is an underlying relationship. This relationship may be more easily traced when one is applying the methods of cultural anthropology, as was the case in the discussion of religion. If one starts with the premise that the various aspects of a people's life are an interrelated whole, it follows that the religious life bears upon the economic, the economic on the religious, the political on the artistic. The concept of nativism has been used as a means of synthesizing the different cultural trends in Kazakhstan. The significance of the glorification of their past by native Kazakh historians during the Soviet era is clear. The historical traditions of the Kazakhs are important to them; around those traditions they were building in the 1940's the nucleus of an independent revival of Kazakh culture. The Soviets regarded this as dangerous, and the participants were either purged or warned away from the theme. 668 [814]

This sort of cultural revival is a type of nativism known in many parts of the world; the common feature such revivals share is a distinctive religious tone. But it is not the old religion which is being revived among the Kazakhs; rather, the old traditions are being treated in a religious fashion. These traditions become a religion, and the renewed interest in them a religious revival. The movement among the Kazakhs to revive the traditions of the past immediately became involved in politics. The Russian term kultura usually implies such political ramifications. In this sense there is a cultural politics in the Soviet Union.

The cultural taste of the regime in Moscow serves as a model for the rest of the empire. This cultural taste includes in part that which is pleasing to the political leaders of the Soviet Union. It includes 53 179

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177 also what Moscow deems proper to see developing in the provinces.
The architecture which is encouraged in Moscow is only part of the
climate of cultural taste. Public buildings in Alma-Ata reflect both
[341] Russian 19th century Baroque and Central Asiatic architectural themes:
Russian columns and massiveness, Central Asiatic arches and blue
tile ornament. Soviet architects have taken basic ideas from Russian
contemporary architecture and to them added local ideas. Whether
these hybrids are suited to local conditions of weather, availability of
materials, and so forth, is another matter.

"Nationalist in form, socialist in content" was a much-publicized slogan 20 years ago; but it is seldom mentioned today. One can easily discuss Soviet art or architecture without reference to this formula; it no longer has even a covert role to play. The modern slogan might read "Soviet in basic form, local style in ornament."

668 This trend is evident in other forms of expression as well. Let us consider the topic of heroes. In the historical tradition, the Kazakh revival was centered around heroes of the past such as Kenesary Kasymov. This is not in keeping with the sense of heroism which the Kremlin seeks to instill in the Kazakhs. During the 1920's and 1930's, Moscow permitted only such heroes as Frunze and Chapayev, who fought the civil war in the steppes of Central Asia. To these has been added the figure of Amangeldy, a Kazakh who was an early member of the Bolshevik party. The revival of 19th century Kazakh heroes in the 1940's took place under conditions of wartime desperation. Moscow was anxious to sound any note that might awaken the feelings of the Kazakhs, to let any theme be pursued. The Soviets sought to show that the Russian revolutionaries in fighting the Tsars had advanced the same cause as had Kenesary, and that the Kazakhs and the Bolsheviks should therefore make common cause.

During World War II the possible selection of heroes expanded to include not only military and political leaders of the past, but literary
[538] and scientific figures as well. Abai Kunanbaev, a 19th century Kazakh poet, has been much publicized in novels, plays, movies, and literary essays. He is acceptable to the Russians, for he was the translator into Kazakh of Russian poetry. Moreover, he was a friend of anti-Tsarist Russians, among them Chernyshevsky, a novelist and revolutionary exile. Chokan Valikhanov, although a Kazakh, was an officer of the Tsars, educated in St. Petersburg University, a member of
[814] leading artistic and intellectual circles, and author of historical and ethnographic notes on the Kazakh past. He has been no less honored than Abai or Kenesary. Altynsarin, perhaps the greatest Kazakh intellectual, an educator, publicist, editor, ethnographer, and creator of a Kazakh alphabet, was likewise given a pre-eminent place in the Kazakh revival.

[214] In the 1940's a Kazakh literary and artistic journal Adabiet zhane
[538] iskusstvo ("Literature and Art") was started. Adabiet is a Kazakh word meaning literature, iskusstvo a Russian word meaning art; the title thus expresses the mixed character of contemporary Kazakh arts and literature. It can hardly be said that the journal is a success. It has been attacked for deviations from the political line, as might have been

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

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expected. In addition to being ideologically weak, from Moscow's viewpoint, it has been criticized for appearing irregularly. And above all, thousands of copies are left unsold.[1] In a word, it does not suit the aims of the Soviet regime, nor does it satisfy the needs of the Kazakhs.

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At the beginning of the revival, in the early 1940's, an attempt was made to purify the Kazakh language of Russianisms, or failing that, to apply Kazakh orthographic rules to borrowed Russian words. The leading Kazakh novelist, Mukhtar Auezov, wrote a novel on the life of Abai Kunanbaev, in which he attempted to adapt the spelling of Russian words to the Kazakh language. This adaptation is most important in poetry, because the stress or accent in Kazakh falls only on the last syllable, while in Russian, as in English, it may fall on any syllable. Auezov was severely criticized for this "error" by a philologist who asserted that Abai himself retained Russian words in their original form when there was no Kazakh equivalent. Auezov admitted his errors and agreed to purge from his language Kazakh treatment of Russian words.[2] The whole controversy is specious, for Kazakh orthography had not been standardized in the 19th century, when Abai was composing, and is not standardized today. Abai had no standard orthography to impose upon the Russian, and therefore retained the original. Auezov's Kazakhization of the Russian is not so much a scientific achievement as a cultural expression, an attempt to formulate a Kazakh spelling style as part of a literary program in the context of a revival of traditional Kazakh culture.

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Auezov himself presided over one Kazakh attack on another expression of their culture. In an article, "Considerations on the Novel," Auezov criticized a novel by another Kazakh, Mustafin, for its lack of local dialect terms and colloquialisms, its failure to reflect the folklore and the speech of Kazakh village life. But then he added, "In Mustafin's novel, the new president of the collective farm . . . accomplishes miracles in ten months. All goes as though by the flash of a magic wand . . . One detects here the influence of outmoded traditions of folklore whose heroes easily and carelessly cross over seas of fire, find a way through impassable forests and fly across immeasurable spaces upon the magical bird Zemurg."[3] Auezov cannot have it both ways. He criticizes Mustafin for lack of contact with the people and then attacks him for coming under the influence of "outmoded" folklore traditions.

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Soviet influence has been responsible for several changes in Kazakh literature. The traditional Kazakh mode of literary expression was poetry. The novel did not exist in Kazakhstan until the advent of the Russians. Today there are a number of novelists, such as Mukhtar Auezov and Sabit Mukanov. Both of them started out as poets, and only later adopted the novel as a literary form.

The aim of Soviet writing, in theory, is to achieve "socialist realism." There should be no romanticizing, no formalism or the quest of form for

[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 30 Oct and 12 Nov 53.
[2] *Ibid.*, 3 Sep 52.
[3] Auezov (4), 1951.

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The form is also imposed by Moscow, whether it concerns the introduction of the novel form in literature or the imitation of the massive architectural style in public buildings. Only the ornament and embellishment are locally derived.

HISTORY

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The same lines of criticism which the Soviets have directed at Kazakh literature and art have been applied to the writing of Kazakh history. The revival of Kazakh historical traditions during World War II developed into a great movement involving many Kazakh historians and writers. In 1950, Pravda published an editorial denouncing the entire movement, choosing for its main target the luckless Bekmakhanov, for his history of the Kenesary movement.[1] The Kazakh Party and press were slow in following the line laid down in Pravda. Only after a four-month delay did Kazakhstanskaia Pravda take up the attack, printing a policy statement from the Central Committee of the Kazakh Party, which commented on the Pravda editorial of the previous December and called for a formal Party hearing on the subject. This hearing took place in April and was reported in Kazakhstanskaia Pravda of 24 April 1951, in an article giving the general Party findings and those of the Party primary organization of the Kazakh Pedagogic Institute. Kenesary was denounced at one meeting as "an enemy of the Kazakh toiling masses" by 11 speakers representing the Party leaders and the academic world. The attack was directed at others: school textbook authors Ismailov and Dzhumaliev, both professors of history; Sauranbaev, director of the Social Science Section of the Academy of Sciences; and one Adilgireev, all in addition to Bekmakhanov. But this was only the beginning.

The attack on Kazakh revivalism continued, centered around the figure of Kenesary, with a different series of authors subjected to the sternest criticism. The line now advanced by Pravda, the Party press of Kazakhstan, and the History Section of the Academy of Sciences, was that there were two kinds of leaders in Central Asia in the 18th and 19th centuries—good leaders and bad. The Kazakh leader Kenesary was bad; he was called a class enemy, a reactionary feudal lord. Other Kazakh leaders were classified as good, for they sought to lead their peoples into an alliance with the oppressed Russian masses, seeking a common solution for their jointly shared troubles. The Kazakh leader Isatai Taimanov, for example, revolted not against the Tsar but against Russian capitalists who were exploiting his people.[2] This indicates, the Soviets conclude, that the Tsars had parallel interests with the poor Russians, while the enemies of both the poor Russians and the poor Kazakhs were the Russian capitalists.

The central Soviet historical journal, Voprosy Istorii ("Questions of History"), published in April 1951 a lead editorial, "On Certain

[1] Pravda, 26 Dec 50.
[2] Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 19 Apr 51.

668 Questions of the History of the Peoples of Central Asia." According to this source, the Turks and Iranians of Central Asia must not look beyond the borders of Russia for the highest expression of their own culture. The editorial asserts: "The investigations of Soviet scholars have shown that the ancient populations of Central Asia were not only eastern Iranians, but also Turkic tribes, that the culture built by them had its indigenous traits. The modern peoples of Central Asia are not immigrants from abroad: they are in the process of historical development from local tribes." Nor was Central Asia only a peripheral area to regions in the south. "To the contrary, the latter must be regarded as peripheral to the ancient cultures of Central Asia."[1]

Shortly thereafter, the attack went beyond all bounds. The Uzbek newspaper Pravda Vostoka censured the great Russian historian Barthold for speaking of Iranian influences on Uzbek civilization.[2] In the late 1940's the famous Arabist Krachkovsky had been accused of mentioning Arab contributions to the civilizations of the North Caucasus.[3] Similar criticisms were aimed at 19th century anti-Tsarist leaders of the Caucasus, such as the Iman Shamil of Ossetia. In Kazakhstan the denunciations of the Kazakh revival included the issues of Pan-Turkism, cosmopolitanism, and finally, the fostering of anti-Russian sentiments. Thus the true dangers to Moscow inherent in the movement were finally expressed.

The Soviet denunciation of revivalism also touched on the dangerous myth of racism. Movements parallel to that in Kazakhstan occurred among the Bashkirs, the Azerbaijani, the Uzbeks, and other Turkic peoples of the Russian empire, both in the 1918 period and during the 1940's. The 1951 Voprosy Istorii editorial proclaimed that the modern peoples of Central Asia are descendants of local tribes. This stressing of purity of descent and lack of admixture with foreign elements is not only untrue, it is totally irrelevant from any scientific standpoint. Culture is transmitted not only by immigration and emigration, but many other means as well. The obvious mixture of descent lines and genes from time immemorial among the peoples, nations, tribes, and states of Central Asia need scarcely be mentioned. Central Asia is possibly the one area of the world where race mixture can be unequivocally demonstrated.

The statement on racism in Voprosy Istorii was tendered cautiously. The local press of the USSR was not so bounded, however. In Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan and the oil capital of the Soviet Union, the newspaper Bakinskii Rabochii sought to "save" the Azerbaijani from Pan-Turkism by asserting that the Azerbaijani were not at all Turkic, but were descendants of the ancient Medes.[4] A statement of similar intent regarding the Bashkirs appeared in a popular book on Bashkiria published in 1950.[5]

[1] *Voprosy Istorii*, 1951, No. 1, pp. 1-5.
[2] *Pravda Vostoka*, 17 Aug 51.
[3] *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 12 Jan, 26 Jan, and 5 Feb 49.
[4] *Bakinskii Rabochii*, 20 Jul 52.
[5] Tokbaev, 1950, p. 120.

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The Soviet leaders have not attempted to block the national revivalism, but have sought instead to divert it to their own ends. The chief premises of the current Soviet thinking on the question of nationalities are as follows. First, the national culture of the peoples of the USSR evolved independently of all foreign influences; it is a purely autonomous and original development. Secondly, this national culture is superior to that of the peoples dwelling beyond the frontiers. Thirdly, the peoples occupying the present territory of the Soviet Union have long formed a great family, united and solidary, of which the Russian people have been the senior members; this united group has always opposed invaders from beyond the present-day borders. Finally, all citizens of the USSR are ethnically, culturally, and racially distinct from the Turkic and Iranian peoples living beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

One sees, then, that in matters of literature and history, art is made to serve the state. The same may be said of science. A Soviet declaration states that the main task of the Academy of Sciences is to assist the great current projects of the Soviet regime. The Academy of Sciences of the KSSR was established shortly after World War II. It consists today of 20 institutes and many other separate scientific centers. It is active in nearly all fields, and is the body which establishes the official policy in the arts and sciences. The Academy has been severely criticized for diverging from the official line in the fields of history, literature, and linguistics. On the other hand, it has been praised by the regime for its record in such fields as engineering, technology, and agronomy, where liaison with industry, transport, and experimental agricultural stations has been satisfactory.[1]

One source of trouble in the organization of scientific work in Kazakhstan has been the relatively small number of Kazakhs on the scientific staffs of their native republic. Of 102 degrees of Doctor of Science awarded in Kazakhstan, only 17 have been earned by Kazakhs. Out of a total of 811 other advanced degrees, about 160 were awarded to Kazakhs. Thus, of these 913 actual and potential leaders in science, 20 per cent are Kazakhs—about half of the proportion of Kazakhs in the total population of Kazakhstan.[2]

The educational system of Kazakhstan is identical with that found throughout the USSR. Primary education is compulsory for all children aged eight or older. A decree of 10 August 1930 made education through the first four school years compulsory; in 1950 attendance was made compulsory through the seventh grade.

The schools are divided as follows: Primary school comprises the first four years, incomplete middle school covers the fifth through seventh years, and middle school covers the eighth through tenth years.

[1] *Central Asian Review* (30), 1953, No. 1, pp. 75-77.
[2] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Dec 51.

towards Russia, Turkey, and England. The cultural cohesion created by Islam that connects Chinese Turkestan with Russian Turkestan and other neighboring Muslim countries, and that created by Buddhism that connects Mongolia with Tibet through Chinghai and small areas of Sinkiang, marked the four provinces of Sinkiang, Chinhai, Kansu, and to a small degree, Shensi, as one single area which represents one administrative unit.

The Eastern Turks:

The main pattern of social life of the Eastern Turks is based primarily on "Oasis Agriculture" with its irrigational complex. All agriculture in this area is made possible through the organized use of water. The family organization among the Eastern Turks is therefore an extended one, since a certain level of productivity can only be reached through collective labor (upkeep of irrigational systems and dikes). One reason the Eastern Turks developed the extended family pattern is that the family recieves water in proportion to the amount of labor its members put into the upkeep of irrigational systems and canals; the greater the family, the more water is therefore provided for their land.

The internal structure of the family system is not based upon clan rules. Eastern Turkic communities are governed by a body of leaders, selected from the community itself whereas the larger governmental districts are headed by Chinese officials or, at present, by Chinese Communists. A secondary aspect of Eastern Turkic social life is formed by trade and handicrafts. Merchants and craftsmen form "guilds" which in turn influence the social life of the community.

Kirghiz and Kazakhs:

Kirghiz and Kazakh society is clan-based. (The definition of the notion of "clan" is explained in the chapter about the Social Structure.) All family relationships are deeply rooted in the clan system. The main pattern of social life among these two tribes is created by their nomadic way of life, whose most essential economic activity is cattle breeding. The transition to a semi-sedentary life is now under way. The Communists insist that the Kirghiz and Kazakhs occupy a permanent winter camp site, since this facilitates better political control over the tribes. The choice of the summer camp site still remains more or less in the hands of the tribes. Kirghiz and Kazakhs are ruled by "biks," or "manaps" (elders) responsible to the Chinese officials.

The Mongols: general remarks.

Mongol social life is based on nomadic pastoralism. The basic unit is the nuclear family. A group of patrilineally